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Comments and Casenotes
Imputed Contributory Negligence In Automobile Cases
Weber v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc.'
Plaintiff, an owner-passenger, suffered bodily injury and property
damage when his employee-operated truck collided with the defendant's.
The trial court upheld the jury's findings of contributory negligence on
the part of plaintiff's servant and instructed the jury that, under the
circumstances, such negligence should be imputed to plaintiff.2 The
Supreme Court of Minnesota, overruling long established precedent3
by rejecting the universal rule of imputed contributory negligence' in
automobile negligence cases, reversed and ordered a new trial. The
court expressly limited its holding to automobile negligence cases, leav-
ing for later decisions the job of expanding the holding. Due to the
1. 274 Minn. 482, 144 N.W.2d 540 (1966).
2. The result, therefore, was a verdict for the defendant on the ground that the
contributory negligence of the plaintiff's servant barred recovery by the plaintiff.
Plaintiff now appeals the verdict of the trial court. 274 Minn. at 484, 144 N.W.2d at 541.
3. E.g., Simcoe v. Pope, 266 Minn. 197, 123 N.W.2d 311 (1963); Frankle v.
Twedt, 234 Minn. 42, 47 N.W.2d 482 (1951) ; Rogge v. Great N. Ry., 233 Minn. 255,
47 N.W.2d 475 (1951) ; Pearson v. Northland Transp. Co., 184 Minn. 560, 239 N.W.
602 (1931). See Murphy v. Keating, 204 Minn. 269, 283 N.W. 389 (1939) (joint
enterprise). The Supreme Court of Minnesota has continually examined this doctrine
in other contexts, Ristau v. Riley, 230 Minn. 341, 41 N.W.2d 772 (1950); Jacobson
v. Dailey, 228 Minn. 201, 36 N.W.2d 711 (1949); Christensen v. Hennepin Transp.
Co., 215 Minn. 394, 10 N.W.2d 406 (1943) (rejecting imputed contributory negli-
gence in bailor-bailee relationships which were also parent-child relationships). Cf.
Nadeau v. Melin, 260 Minn. 369, 110 N.W.2d 29 (1961); Tschida v. Dorle, 235 Minn.
461, 51 N.W.2d 561 (1952) ; Guile v. Greenberg, 197 Minn. 635, 268 N.W. 418 (1936)
(requiring a finding of control on the part of the master-plaintiff such as would almost
constitute personal negligence).
4. E.g., Little v. Hackett, 116 U.S. 366 (1886) (passenger) ; Muhammad v.
United States, 366 F.2d 298 (9th Cir. 1966) (owner-passenger; wife also barred)
(dictum) ; Knapp v. Styer, 280 F.2d 384 (8th Cir. 1960) (lessor-lessee's employee)
Cox v. Maddux, 255 F. Supp. 517 (E.D. Ark. 1966) (military superior-passenger);
Miller v. United States, 196 F. Supp. 613 (D. Mass. 1961) (wife-owner-passenger)
City of Newark v. United States, 149 F. Supp. 917 (D.N.J. 1957), aff'd, 254 F.2d 93 (3d
Cir. 1958) (owner-employer); Kline v. Barkett, 68 Cal. App. 2d 765, 158 P.2d 51 (1945)
(husband-owner-passenger) ; Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Caster, 216 A.2d 689 (Del. 1966)
(owner-passenger); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Tomlinson, 373 S.W.2d 601 (Ky.
1963) (owner-employer) ; Mammelli v. Dufrene, 169 So. 2d 242 (La. Ct. App. 1964)
(owner); Slutter v. Homer, 244 Md. 131, 223 A.2d 141 (1966) (owner-passenger-
parent) ; Ter Haar v. Steele, 330 Mich. 167, 47 N.W.2d 65 (1951) (owner-employer-
passenger) ; Sztaba v. Great N. Ry., 411 P.2d 379 (Mont. 1966) (employer-R.R. Co.);
Petersen v. Schneider, 154 Neb. 303, 47 N.W.2d 863 (1951) (owner-passenger)
Moore v. Crocker, 264 N.C. 233, 141 S.E.2d 307 (1965) (bailor) ; Torga v. West,
260 N.C. 182, 132 S.E.2d 357 (1963) (owner-employer) ; Lacen v. Miller, 316 P.2d
167 (Okla. 1957) (husband-owner) ; Downey v. Rymorowicz, 392 Pa. 205, 154 A.2d
179 (1959) (owner-passenger-joint enterprise) ; Southern Ry. v. Butts, 379 S.W.2d
794 (Tenn. 1964) (owner-passenger-husband); Frank v. McCarthy, 112 Utah
422, 188 P.2d 737 (1948) (employer-parent); Young v. Lamson, 160 A.2d 873
(Vt. 1960) (owner-parent) ; W. PROSSER, TORTS § 73 (3d ed. 1964); RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) or TORTS § 486 (1965) ; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 317 (1958) ;
RESTATEMENT or TORTS § 486 (1934); For a general discussion see Note, The Private
Agent's Liability Alter a Suit by the Third Party Has Been Brought to a Judg-
ment For or Against the Principal, 36 GEo. L.J. 238 (1948).
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large amount of litigation in this field the scope of this note will be
limited to automobile negligence, which is the broadest area affected
by the general rule which imputes the servant's contributory negligence
to his master.
It is necessary to examine the relationship of the rule of imputed
contributory negligence to the general rules of negligence and agency
to best understand and appreciate the significance of the court's decision.
The concept of negligence requires no discussion ;5 nor does contribu-
tory negligence, the age-old doctrine providing that the careless plain-
tiff may not recover.6 In applying the rules of negligence in an agency
situation, Blackstone stated that "The wrong done by the servant is
looked upon in law as the wrong of the master himself."7 It is believed
that it was this statement from which Pollock purportedly coined the
term "vicarious liability."' Once the law recognized the doctrine of
imputed negligence, it was foreseeable that the doctrine of imputed con-
tributory negligence would gain favor. Under this doctrine, a master's
cause of action is held to be barred by the contributory negligence of
his servant.9 These rules which render the master chargeable with the
negligent and contributorily negligent acts of his servants are an appli-
cation of the concept of vicarious liability which is often referred to as
respondeat superior.'0
As stated by Prosser, "A multitude of very ingenious reasons have
been offered for the vicarious liability of a master. . . ."" Most authori-
ties would admit that the basis for holding a master liable for his ser-
vant's negligence today is one of policy.12 Two of the arguments most
commonly advanced are (1) "the deep pockets" theory, which is based
on the notion that the master is better able to absorb a loss,' 3 and (2)
5. See generally F. POLLOCK, TORTS 355 (1887); W. PROSSER, TORTS § 28 (3d
ed. 1964).
6. See Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809),
criticized in Bohlen, Contributory Negligence, 21 HARV. L. Rzv. 233 (1908) ; But see
Christensen v. Hennepin Transp. Co., 215 Minn. 394, 10 N.W.2d 406, 416 (1943).
See also W. PROSSER, TORTS § 64 n.1 (3d ed. 1964).
7. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIE-S 432 (Lewis ed. 1922).
8. HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 233 (1 House ed. 1941). It has been pointed out
that the term "vicarious" had long been in use. Williams, Vicarious Liability: Tort of
the Master or of the Servant?, 72 L.Q. REv. 522, at 524 n.10 (1956). See F. POLLOCK,
TORTS 72 (1887).
9. See generally W. PROSSER, TORTS § 73 (3d ed. 1964) ; Reno, Imputed Con-
tributory Negligence in Automobile Bailnents, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 213, 215 (1934).
10. See generally F. POLLOCK, TORTS 67-68 (1887) ; W. Sv.Y, AGENCY § 83(1964); Lessler, The Proposed Discard of the Doctrine of Imputed Contributory
Negligence, 20 FORDHAM L. REv. 156, 174-75 (1951), in which the author suggests
that a misconception about the maxim respondeat superior led to its use as part of the
theory of "contributory negligence." Although the maxim existed in Roman Law,
there was no contributory negligence doctrine to which it might be applied. Laski,
The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YAIE L.J. 105 (1916). It has been suggested
that the doctrine of respondeat superior has been extended to cover many unorthodox
situations, the family purpose doctrine as an example. Reno, supra note 9, at 215 (dis-
cussion of the family purpose doctrine at 226).
11. W. PROSSER, TORTS § 68, at 471 (3d ed. 1964).
12. See, e.g., 144 N.W.2d at 542; Johnson v. Los Angeles-Seattle Motor Express,
Inc., 222 Ore. 377, 352 P.2d 1091 (1960); W. PROSSER, TORTS § 68 (3d ed. 1964);
Laski, supra note 10, at 105.
13. Reno, supra note 9, at 215; see generally W. PROSSER, TORTS § 68 (3d ed.
1964) ; James, Vicarious Liability, 28 TUL. L. REv. 161-73 (1954), reprinted in 2 F.
HARPER & F. JAMES, TORTS §§ 26.1-26.5 (1956). Two other theories founded in eco-
nomics are: (1) "creation of risk theory," which would make the loss a cost of the
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"the enforcement theory," which is based on the concept that the master
who knows he will be held liable will use greater care in the selection
and instruction of his employees.' 4 Although criticized by some,' 5 the
vicarious liability doctrine has survived. The arguments are fairly
persuasive, insurance coverage aside, for allowing recovery against a
master in a suit by an injured third party. The arguments become less
persuasive when considering the doctrine of imputed contributory negli-
gence which bars recovery by the master in a suit against a negligent
third party when the master's servant was contributorily negligent.' 6
The evolution and demise of the doctrine, as it was applied in a
number of early cases so as to bar a suit by any passenger, is well
documented. In England, as long ago as 1849, imputed contributory
negligence was applied in the case of a driver and passenger relation-
ship where the passenger was in no way connected with the driver, either
by the laws of agency or vicarious liability,'7 but such imputation of
business since the master created the business for economic benefit and profit; and (2)
the "distribution of loss (or enterprise) theory," which is similar to the prior in requir-
ing the business to incur the expense wherever there is a risk which is calculable and
recurring. In such a case the owner typically makes provision for distributing this
property loss by insurance, or otherwise. See generally James, Imputed Contributory
Negligence, 14 LA. L. Rev. 340, 352-53 (1954), suggesting the replacement of the
"both-ways test" with insurance.
14. But this theory is in conflict with the justification for holding a master liable
because he has the control of the servant. Combining the two arguments appears toleave a circular result: a master is liable because he supposedly can control the acts
of his servant, but the reason for holding a master liable is to force him to control
the acts of his servants
15. See generally W. PROSSR, TORTS § 68 (3d ed. 1964) ; Holmes, Agency,
5 HARV. L. RXv. 1, 14 (1891).
16. See Judson v. Bee Hive Auto Service Co., 136 Ore. 1, 294 P. 588, 297 P. 1050(1931). One argument for imputing contributory negligence was advanced by Professor
Russell R. Reno. Where contributory negligence is not imputed,
[I]f a collision occurs between two bailees through their concurring negli-
gence, each owner will be able to recover from the other owner the amount of
damage to his own automobile. Thus, if there is a collision between a Ford and
a Rolls-Royce as a result of concurring negligence, both being driven by bailees,
the Ford owner will be forced to pay for the damage to the Rolls-Royce and the
Rolls-Royce owner for the damage to the Ford - certainly a remarkable legal
result. Reno, supra note 9, at 223.
This situation was hypothesized in a dissenting opinion in Gochee v. Wagner, 232
App. Div. 401, 250 N.Y.S. 102, 107-08 (1931). It was not until 1949 that an
appellate court was confronted with such a fact situation; Jacobsen v. Dailey, 228
Minn. 201, 36 N.W.2d 711 (1949). A head-on collision occurred due to the concurring
negligence of the sons of the owners. Both were operating the vehicles solely for
their own purposes. The difference in damage was but $100. The court held that
Minnesota's consent statute was not to be used to impute contributory negligence to
a bailor. The Minnesota Supreme Court felt not only that the result was proper, but
a highly equitable solution, citing a Note, Contributory Negligence of Bailee Not
Imputed to Bailor in Suit Against Negligent Third Party: N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic
Law § 59, 17 CORNLL L.Q. 158 (1931).
It would seem logical that the innocent aggrieved bailor should be compen-
sated, and the negligent bailee should be held for the damage he had occasioned.
Actually this mutual absorption of the other's loss might promote greater care on the
part of masters in choosing drivers.
It has been argued that no inconsistency would result if the defendant cor-
poration in Weber could sue the plaintiff for his damages. Each employer was innocent
of personal wrongdoing, has suffered harm by the negligence of another, and should be
compensated. Note, Imputed Contributory Negligence, 9 ARIZ. L. Rev. 122, 128 (1967).
17. Thorogood v. Bryan, 8 C.B. 115, 137 Eng. Rep. 452 (C.P. 1849). The
administratrix in a wrongful death action against the owner of an omnibus was pre-
cluded from recovery for the death of her husband in an accident caused by the
negligence of the driver. The driver was not the servant of the passenger, yet the
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contributory negligence where primary negligence would not be imputed
has since been almost universally rejected.' 8 The following statement
by the United States Supreme Court in Little v. Hackett'9 demon-
strated the American opposition to the application of the doctrine to
such situations and laid the foundation for the so-called "both ways
rule"2 as it has since evolved:
It would seem . . . that when one has been injured by the
wrongful act of another, to which he has in no respect contributed,
he should be entitled to compensation in damages from the wrong-
doer. And such is the generally received doctrine, unless a con-
tributory cause of the injury has been the negligence or fault of
some person towards whom he sustains the relation of superior
or master, in which case the negligence is imputed to him, though
he may not have personally participated in or had knowledge of it;
and he must bear the consequences.2 '
Although a complete history of the development of the "both-ways"
rule, adopting the rationale of Little v. Hackett, is outside the scope of
this note,22 it should be pointed out that the original Restatement of
Torts provided that a plaintiff was barred "if, but only if, the relation
between them is such that the plaintiff would be liable as defendant for
harm caused to others by such negligent conduct of the third person.''23
The current Restatement, in recognition, of -the fact that "[d] uring the
latter part of the nineteenth century a good many courts 'imputed' the
negligence of the third person to the plaintiff in a number of situations,
because of theories of a fictitious agency relation, which are now gener-
contributory negligence of the driver was imputed to the passenger, one of several,
so as to bar recovery by his widow. Lessler, supra note 10, at 157, states that the doc-
trine of "imputed negligence" was said to have arisen in this case. The decision in
Thorogood is based on a theory of "identification," i.e., having trusted the party by
selecting the particular conveyance, the plaintiff has so far identified himself with the
owner and his servants, that, if any injury results from their negligence, he must be
considered a party to it. Thorogood was overruled in England in Mills v. Armstrong
(The "Bernina"), [1888] 13 App. Cas. 1 (P.C.).
18. See, e.g., Little v. Hackett, 116 U.S. 366 (1886) ; Philadelphia, W. & B.R.
Co. v. Hogeland, 66 Md. 149, 7 A. 105 (1886) ; Follman v. City of Mankato, 35 Minn.
522, 29 N.W. 317 (1886) ; Annot., 90 A.L.R. 630 (1934) ; Corrigan, Imputed Negli-
gence as Applied Against a Guest in a Private Conveyance, 3 MARQ. L. Rzv. 169
(1919) (case collection by states). One area where it seems to survive is an action
for loss of consortium, where the deprivative nature of the action is thought to require
imputations where no primary negligence would be imputed. See Note, Maryland
Prescribes Joint Action for Negligently Caused Loss of Consortium, 27 MD. L. Rev.
403 (1967).
19. 116 U.S. 366 (1886).
20. I.e., if liability runs from a master to an injured third party, the contributory
negligence of the servant runs to the master in a suit against the third party. See
generally Gregory, Vicarious Responsibility and Contributory Negligence, 41 YALE
L.J. 831, 833 (1932). The instant case provides a concise history of the development
of the rule. 144 N.W.2d at 541-42. See cases, note 4 supra.
21. 116 U.S. at 371.
22. See generally W. PROSSHR, TORTS § 73 (3d ed. 1964) and cases cited therein.
See, e.g., cases, note 4 supra.
23. RiSTrATZM-NT or TORTS § 485 (1934) : "Except as stated in §§ 493 and 494, a
plaintiff is barred from recovery by the negligence act or omission of a third person if,
but only if, the relation between them is such that the plaintiff would be liable as
defendant for harm caused to others by such negligent conduct of the third person."
The "both-ways" test is said to rest on a "true agency." Keeton, Imputed Contributory
Negligence, 13 TtXAs L. RZv. 161, 162-63 (1935).
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ally recognized as pure fiction, and no longer valid,"24 now provides
that a plaintiff is not barred "by the negligent act or omission of a third
person"" unless the relationship is one of master-servant, joint enter-
prise, or one in which a person is suing for the death or loss of services
of another who has been contributorily negligent.26 When either the
master-servant or joint enterprise relationship does exist, as in the
instant case, the so-called "both-ways" rule has been applied with the
result that, in a suit against a third party tortfeasor, the contributory
negligence of the driver would be imputed to the passenger since there
is a relationship between the driver and passenger which would render
the passenger vicariously liable for the driver's act in a suit by a non-
negligent third party.27
Where there is no employment relationship between driver and
passenger upon which to base a finding that a master-servant relation-
ship exists, or where the joint enterprise relationship is unclear, the
courts have often looked to the passenger's control over the driver as a
basis for such a finding.2" While it may be true to say that where a
master-servant relationship actually exists there is always to be found a
co-existent "right to control" the servant, and conversely, where an
actual "right to control" is found, there is almost always to be found a
co-existent master-servant relationship,29 it is not true to say that where
24. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) ov TORTS § 485, comment a (1965).
25. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) or TORTS § 485 (1965) : "Except as stated in §§ 486,
491 and 494, a plaintiff is not barred from recovery by the negligent act or omission
of a third person."
Section 486: "A master is barred form recovery against a negligent defend-
ant by the contributory negligence of his servant acting within the scope of his
employment."
The Restatement (Second), therefore rejects the doctrine of "imputed con-
tributory negligence" as being based on the theories of fictitious agency relations
which are now generally recognized as pure fiction and are no longer valid. But
Section 485 is subject to Sections 486, 491, and 494. Section 486 comment (a) states
that the rule of Section 485 does not purport to determine the existence of the rela-
tions of master and servant. Section 491 comment (j) states that: " . . . [I]f the
purpose of the journey is for the benefit of the owner, even though it is also for the
benefit of him who is permitted to drive, the owner may under the principles of the
law of Agency be regarded as the master of the driver even though no wages or
reward other than the participation in the drive is paid to him." The Minnesota court
in Weber, 144 N.W.2d at 544, rejected the Restatement distinction.
26. RESTATEMENT (SgcoND) op TORTS §§ 486, 491, 494 (1965). As to Section 494,
see Note, Maryland Prescribes Joint Action for Negligently Caused Loss of Con-
sortium, 27 MD. L. Rxv. 403 (1967).
27. Powers v. State, 178 Md. 23, 11 A.2d 909 (1940) ; cases cited note 4 supra;
Reno, supra note 9.
28. See, e.g.. Gray v. Citizens Cas. Co., 286 F.2d 625 (4th Cir. 1960) ; Miller v.
United States, 196 F. Supp. 613, 617 (D. Mass. 1961) ; Knight v. Handley Motor Co.,
198 A.2d 747, 750 (D.C. Ct. App. 1964) (dictum) ; Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Revlett,
224 Ind. 313, 65 N.E.2d 731, 735 (1946) ; Merritt v. Darden, 227 Md. 589, 176 A.2d
205 (1962) ; Frankle v. Twedt, 234 Minn. 42, 47 N.W.2d 482, 487-88 (1951) ; Payne
v. Kinder, 147 W. Va. 352, 127 S.E.2d 726 (1962) ; Note, Auto Owner's Liability for
Injury Caused by Guest Permitted to Drive, 5 MD. L. Rtv. 104, 107 (1940).
29. The Maryland Court of Appeals has set forth five criteria that may be con-
sidered in determining whether the relation of master and servant exists:
(1) Selection and engagement of the servant.
(2) Payment of wages.
(3) Power to discharge.(4) Power to control the servant's conduct.
(5) Inclusion of the work as a part of the regular business of the employer.
Standing alone, none of these indicia, excepting (4) seems controlling in the
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there is a presumed "right to control" the servant, there is to be found a
co-existent master-servant relationship. A fiction is thereby built upon
a fiction. This presumed right to control, which may be called the
"right to control" theory, reasons that if the passenger has the presumed
"right to control" the actions and movements of the driver, the passen-
ger is then presumed to be his master and is chargeable with his negli-
gent acts. If the passenger happens also to be the owner, courts have
sometimes seemingly dispensed with the requiremnt that the facts
establish a true agency and have simply presumed that the owner had
the requisite control, or "right to control," to justify imputing the
drivers' negligence." Although the passenger was not an owner in
Schmid v. Eslick,31 the principle was aptly stated: "We think it clear
that in the ordinary and accepted affairs of men, the 'control' of an
automobile which is ascribed to a passenger in applying the doctrine of
joint enterprise, often is too obviously a fiction upon which is erected
a second fiction that the driver is his agent."
32
The Minnesota court not only rejected the extreme fiction of pre-
suming right to control but also decided that fault principles should be
controlling in this area. First, after tracing the history of the doctrine
of imputed contributory negligence and the "both-ways" test, the court
concluded that "there is just no way to rationalize the rule . . . ,
since there is no need to furnish financial responsibility 4 to an injured
party in an owner's action to recover for damages resulting from the
negligent act of a third party.'5 Then, regretting the fact that the
determination as to whether such relationship exists. The decisive test in
determining . . . is whether the employer has the right to control and direct
the servant in the performance of his work and in the manner in which the
work is to be done. . . . [I]t is his right to do so that is important. Keitz v.
National Paving & Contracting Co., 214 Md. 479, 491, 136 A.2d 229 (1956).
30. Merritt v. Darden, 227 Md. 589, 176 A.2d 205 (1962) ; Powers v. State, 178
Md. 23, 11 A.2d 909 (1940), noted in Auto Owner's Liability for Injury Caused by
Guest Permitted to Drive, 5 MD. L. Rtv. 104 (1960) ; Gochee v. Wagner, 257 N.Y. 344,
178 N.E. 553 (1931). This theory dates back to the time of Thorogood when as a
practical matter a passenger could easily take control of the team or alight from the
carriage if he was dissatisfied with his chauffeur's competence. The Maryland Court
of Appeals has stated:
Under the law of this State an owner of an automobile - since there is a pre-
sumption that he is in control of its operation while riding in it as a passenger -
is as liable for damages in the event of a collision due to the negligence of the
operator as if he himself had been operating the automobile. Merritt v. Darden,
227 Md. 589, 596, 176 A.2d 205, 209 (1962) (contributory negligence imputed
to owner-passenger).
31. 181 Kan. 997, 317 P.2d 459 (1957).
32. Id. at 464.
33. 144 N.W.2d at 543.
34. The Minnesota Financial Responsibility Act provides that the owner of any
automobile shall be liable for the negligence of any operator who uses the auto with
his consent. MINN. STAT. § 170.54 (1960). Maryland has no such statute. See generally
2 F. HARPMR & F. JAMES, TORTS § 23.6 (1956) ; Note, Motor Vehicles: Contributory
Negligence of Bailee Not Imputed to Bailor in Suit Against Negligent Third Party;
N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 59, 17 CORNELL L.Q. 158 (1931); 34 MINN. L. REv. 57
(1949) ; 31 NOTRt DAME LAW. 724 (1956); 40 U. DIr. L.J. 268 (1912).
35. Christensen v. Hennepin Transp. Co., 215 Minn. 394, 10 N.W.2d 406 (1943).
The Weber court gives other good reasons for rejecting the rule:
For instance, the negligence of the servant is not imputed to the master in a suit
by the master against the servant, but when he sues a third party joint tortfeasor,
he is barred from recovery from such third party. In the case of a joint enter-
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original Restatement § 495"6 test for liability based on the passenger's
own contributory negligence, where vicarious liability did not apply,
had not been adopted by courts when first faced with the problem of
imputed contributory negligence, and noting that such a test would
have been more in keeping with "our concept of negligence based on
fault, ' 37 the court rejected the doctrine of imputed contributory negli-
gence in automobile cases, even where a master-servant relationship
exists.38
The court next considered whether the requirement of the original
Restatement rule for barring a passenger because of his own contribu-
prise, the negligence of one of those so engaged is imputed to all in a suit against
a third person but not in a suit inter se. 144 N.W.2d at 543.
Accord, Powers v. State, 178 Md. 23, 31, 11 A.2d 909, 912 (1940) (dictum) : "... the
doctrine of imputed negligence is inapplicable as between the parties." See W. PROSSER,
TORTS § 71 (3d ed. 1964). Weber was not the first court to reject the "both-ways"
rule where a master-servant relationship was not involved. In Johnson v. Los Angeles-
Seattle Motor Express, Inc., 222 Ore. 377, 352 P.2d 1091 (1960), the owner-passenger
was asleep in the back seat. Holding that the owner-passenger was not barred in his
suit against a negligent third party the court stated:
If contributory negligence is a doctrine of dubious virtue, then there is no
good reason for inventing fictitious fault where there is no real negligence, to bar
an injured passenger, even though the same passenger, as an owner, might
herself be liable as a matter of public policy for injuries to others under
certain circumstances.
[4] The practical necessity for imposing liability on an owner in the cases
which do justify the doctrine of imputed liability is not present in the situation
where the owner is an injured passenger in his own car. The two-way test of
the Restatement does not commend itself as either useful or necessary. . . . It
would have been a jury question whether at the time of the accident Johnson was
actually exercising control over the driver of the car. . . . 352 P.2d at 1095.
Many authorities have attacked the rule of imputed contributory negligence. See
generally Gilmore, Imputed Negligence, 1 Wis. L. REv. 193, 257 (1921) ; Gregory,
supra note 20; Harper & Kime, The Duty to Control the Conduct of Another, 43
YALE L.J. 886 (1934) ; James, supra note 13 (2 articles) ; Keeton, supra note 26;
Lessler, supra note 10; Mechem, The Contributory Negligence of Automobile Pas-
sengers, 78 U. PA. L. Rgv. 736 (1930) ; Reno, supra note 9.
36. RESTATMPNT o TORTS § 495 (1934) provides:
A plaintiff is barred from recovery if the negligence of a third person is a
legally contributing cause of his harm and the plaintiff
(a) has the ability to control the conduct of the third person, and
(b) knows or has reason to know that he has such ability, and(c) knows or should know
(i) that it is necessary to exercise his control, and
(ii) that he has an opportunity to do so, and
(d) fails to utilize such opportunity with reasonable care.
RESTATEMENT (StcOND) OF TORTS § 495 (1965):
A plaintiff is barred from recovery if the negligence of a third person is a
legally contributing cause of his harm, and the plaintiff has been negligent in
failing to control the conduct of such person.
37. Some courts attempt to accomplish this by stating that the effect of the
owner's "right to control" is a jury question. Capital Transit Co. v. Simpson, 235
F.2d 525 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 882 (1956), applying Maryland law
(owner liable in absence of proof that he relinquished control - citing Powers v.
State, 178 Md. 23, 11 A.2d 909 (1940)) ; Menzigian v. La Riviere, 334 Mass. 610,
136 N.E.2d 925 (1956) ; Rocky Mountain Produce Trucking Co. v. Johnson, 78 Nev.
44, 369 P.2d 198 (1962); Johnson v. Los Angeles-Seattle Motor Express, Inc., 222
Ore. 377, 352 P.2d 1091 (1960), and cases cited therein.
38. 144 N.W.2d at 544. Earlier the court had stated:
There is no necessity for creating a solvent defendant in that situation, nor can
any of the reasons given for holding a master vicariously liable in a suit by third
persons be defended on any rational ground when applied to imputing negligence
of a servant to a faultless master who seeks recovery from a third person for
his own injury or damage. Why should the negligent third person escape liability
under these circumstances? Id. at 542.
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tory negligence could be applied. The Restatement of Torts § 495
provides:
A plaintiff is barred from recovery if the negligence of a
third person is a legally contributing cause of his harm and the
plaintiff
(a) has the ability to control the conduct of the third person,
and
(b) knows or has reason to know that he has such ability, and
(c) knows or should know
(i) that it is necessary to exercise his control, and
(ii) that he has an opportunity to do so, and
(d) fails to utilize such opportunity with reasonable care.
The court asked if the requirement, that the passenger have the
"ability to control the conduct" of the driver, could be satisfied by
any theoretical right of control on the part of the owner-passenger,
and found that a "theoretical right of control" was not a proper basis
for finding actual personal negligence in automobile cases.39 Calling
attention to the practical difficulties of a master's attempting to exercise
control of an automobile on a modern highway, the court pointed out
that an attempt to exercise control would be, in fact, "the clearest
evidence of active negligence on the part of the master"4 and continued:
Imputed negligence, on the other hand, presupposes that the
master is innocent of any fault. How, then, can we reconcile
the theory of right of control, the exercise of which would charge
the master with negligence and imputed negligence based on the
theory that he is free from any fault? The two just do not
hang together. 41
Although it would seem that Weber is a sound and practical de-
cision,42 the court may have overstated its case in rejecting the "right
39. 144 N.W.2d at 545. See cases cited note 28 supra and accompanying text.
40. Id. The court cited Jenks v. Veeder Contracting Co., 177 Misc. 240, 30
N.Y.S.2d 278 (Sup. Ct. 1941), aff'd and notified on other grounds, 264 App. Div. 979,
37 N.Y.S.2d 230 (1942), appeal dismissed, 289 N.Y. 787, 46 N.E.2d 848 (1943).
Parties having equal legal title to a motor vehicle cannot be permitted to contend
for the wheel in moving traffic. . . . The realities of the actual operation of
vehicles on highways cannot be entirely overlooked in dealing with the rights
and obligations of those present with the driver. 177 Misc. 240, 30 N.Y.S.2d at 281.
The court in Weber expanded further upon the insight of the New York court:
Application of the rule imputing contributory negligence of a servant to a master
in a suit by the master to recover against a negligent third party, when the master
is not present in the car at all, is hard to justify on any theory. When the
master is present as a passenger, as he was in the case before us, there may be
some chance that he could exercise his theoretic control over the operation of the
car if he saw fit to do so. But even here, unless it can be shown that he actually
tried to take over manual operation of the vehicle, what chance does he have to
exercise this right? 144 N.W.2d at 544.
41. 144 N.W.2d at 545.
42. For an interesting exercise in verbal gymnastics praising the court for their
good common sense see Note, Agency - Vicarious Liability - Abrogation of the Both
Ways Rule, 16 D4PAUL L. Rxv. 478 (1967).
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to control" rationale. A literal reading of the opinion could indicate
that at no time could a master-passenger satisfy the requirement of the
original Restatement § 495 - i.e., at no time would he actually have
"the ability to control" the driver. If this is true, then it would seem
that the requisite "control" could never be found in order to establish
negligence under Restatement § 495. It is highly unlikely that this is
what the court meant to imply since, clearly, there are "control" situa-
tions which may give rise to contributory negligence on the part of the
passenger under the old § 495, which the court states is the better
rule.48
Although Minnesota is the first state to reject the imputation
of negligence to an owner-passenger in all situations, a few other courts
have tempered the rule. New York," Louisiana,45 and Oregon46 have
recognized that no more than a fictitious agency exists if the "right to
control" based solely on ownership and presence in the automobile is
the only basis of the agency.47 Kansas, in considering the imputation
of contributory negligence to the non-owner-passenger on the basis of
joint enterprise, has indicated that the rule must yield to the realities
of life.48 Such courts have reasoned that it is the man behind the wheel
43. For example, failure to protest against improper driving. See generally State
ex rel. Brandau v. Brandau, 176 Md. 584, 6 A.2d 233 (1939) ; W. PROSSER, TORTS § 73
(3d ed. 1964). Often such conduct may border upon assumption of risk. See Baltimore
County v. State ex rel. Keenan, 232 Md. 350, 193 A.2d 30 (1962).
44. New York recently refused to impute the contributory negligence of a driver-
wife to her owner-passenger-husband in Lindner v. State, 49 Misc. 2d 908, 268 N.Y.S.2d
760, 764 (1966):
We do not see how it can be said that Mr. Lindner [owner-passenger] had
the legal right to control the operation of his automobile when he never had driven
an automobile nor was it shown that he knew how to operate an automobile.
The application of the doctrine of imputable negligence depends upon the cir-
cumstances involved and must yield to reason. [citations omitted]. To say a
person who never has driven nor was licensed to drive .. .had the legal right to
control . . . is not in the interest of public safety.
Lindner cited Jenks v. Veeder Contracting Co., 177 Misc. 240, 30 N.Y.S.2d 278 (Sup.
Ct. 1941), and distinguished Gochee v. Wagner, 257 N.Y. 344, 178 N.E. 553 (1931),
where a husband-owner-passenger was held barred by his driver-wife's contributory
negligence, since as owner, he assumed dominion over the car while physically present,
"and had the legal right to control its operation." 178 N.E. at 554.
45. Gaspard v. LeMaire, 245 La. 239, 158 So. 2d 149, 154 (1963) : "It is unrealistic
to hold, in the present day uses of motor vehicles when heavy traffic is the rule and
not the exception, that the occupant of a motor vehicle has factually any control or
right of control over the driving of the operator." The fact that Louisiana is a civil
law state is of no consequence under the circumstance. Prior to Gaspard, Louisiana
followed the "right of control" doctrine of the common law. See Waguespack v.
Savarese, 13 So. 2d 726 (La. Ct. App. 1943). Louisiana still follows the "both-ways"
rule if there is some agency relationship involved. Dowden v. Hartford Accident &
Indemnity Co., 151 So. 2d 697 (La. Ct. App. 1963) (imputing negligence to husband
as head and master of the community).
46. Johnson v. Los Angeles-Seattle Motor Express, Inc., 222 Ore. 377, 352 P,2d
1091 (1960).
47. "Control as the basis for the master's liability for the servant's negligence is
obviously a fictitious control; the master is liable whether or not he in fact had any
control over his servant." Harper & Kime, supra note 35, at 891. But to create a
status of agency between the parties, more may be needed than the mere power of one
party to direct and control the other. See RESTATEMENT (StcoND) ov AGENCY §§ 221-
25 (1958). See also Note, Auto Owner's Liability for Injury Caused by Guest
Permitted to Drive, 5 MD. L. Rev. 104, 107 (1940).
48. Schmid v. Eslick, 181 Kan. 997, 317 P.2d 459 (1957). The Supreme Court of
Kansas pointed out that:
As a practical matter, it must be conceded that when an automobile is driven on
present-day highways with their peculiar hazards of traffic, a passenger has no
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who actually controls and directs the speed and operation of the
vehicle,49 and that "right to control does not equal actual control."5
The owner-passenger may have no control over sudden and unexpected
acts of negligence on the part of the driver, but, on the other hand, he
may not sit idly by and permit obvious statutory violations,5 since to
do so would amount to actual contributory negligence on his part.
The Maryland Court of Appeals recently considered the doctrine
of imputed contributory negligence in Slutter v. Homer,52 where an
owner-passenger-parent 53 sued a negligent third party for personal in-juries suffered in an accident in which her daughter-driver had been
contributorily negligent. The trial court directed a verdict for the
defendant on the grounds that the daughter-driver was contributorily
negligent as a matter of law, and that her negligence was imputable
to her mother. On appeal, the court, reaching a result opposite from that
in Weber, but in line with most authority, held that the plaintiff was
barred from recovery "because of the negligence of her daughter,
whether that holding is based on the law of agency or on the contro-
versial doctrine of imputed negligence." 4 In so wording their decision,
however, it can be argued that the Maryland court indicated some
degree of dissatisfaction with the doctrine of imputed contributory
negligence as well as a distinct talent for circumlocution.
It is submitted that the Maryland court has indicated that it is
ready to abandon what it calls "imputed negligence" as applied to con-
tributory negligence and will likely base its further decisions on what
it terms "the law of agency." As the term "imputed negligence" in
conventional terminology includes imputation pursuant to the law of
physical control over the operation of the vehicle and may not, in safety to him-
self, the driver, or others lawfully using the highways, interfere with that opera-
tion. If he has concern for the safe operation of the vehicle, he may warn, he may
admonish, or he may protest, but it is "the man behind the wheel" who actually
controls and directs its speed and operation. 317 P.2d at 464.
49. Schmid v. Eslick, 181 Kan. 997, 317 P.2d 459, 464 (1957).
50. Johnson v. Los Angeles-Seattle Motor Express, Inc., 222 Ore. 377, 352 P.2d
1091, 1094 (1960).
51. Phillips v. Foster, 252 Iowa 1075, 109 N.W.2d 604, 609 (1961) ; Beye v.Andres, 179 Kan. 502, 296 P.2d 1049 (1956). The duty of care of an owner-passenger
should certainly be no less than that of an ordinary passenger. An ordinary passenger
may be guilty of negligence by diverting the driver's attention. State v. Brandon,
176 Md. 584, 6 A.2d 233 (1933). A passenger has a duty to exercise reasonable care
to discover dangers. Havens v. Schaffer, 217 Md. 323, 142 A.2d 624 (1958). See also
Note, Contributory Negligence of Automobile Passengers, 12 CLISV.-MAR. L. Rv.
447 (1963).
52. 244 Md. 131, 223 A.2d 141 (1966).
53. It can be argued that unless an actual master-servant relationship can be
shown existing between parent-child, owner-passenger-parent should be treated no
differently than owner-passenger since Maryland has rejected the family purpose
doctrine. Talbott v. Gegenheimer, 245 Md. 186, 225 A.2d 462 (1967); Schneider v.
Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498 (1930) ; Myers v. Shipley, 140 Md. 380, 116 A. 645(1922). Maryland does impute the negligence of a minor to the person who signed his
application for driver's license. MD. CODM ANN. art. 66Y, § 93(b) (1957). See 18
MD. L. Rev. 356 (1958). If, however, a minor files a certificate of financial repson-
sibility, he relieves the signer from liability. MD. CoD ANN. art. 66I/, § 93(c)(1957) ; State ex rel. Shipley v. Walker, 230 Md. 133, 186 A.2d 472 (1962) ; Annot.,
26 A.L.R.2d 1320 (1952).
54. 244 Md. at 140, 223 A.2d at 145 (1966). It has been suggested that the cases
treat the questions of vicarious liablity for negligence and vicarious responsibility
for contributory negligence as one and the same. See Reno, supra note 9.
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agency, including respondeat superior and master-servant concepts, it
is somewhat difficult to translate the court's opinion in Slutter. It is
hoped that the following analysis of the Maryland cases, including
Slutter, will demonstrate that the doctrine, which the court has termed
"highly controversial" and which it seems ready to reject as a sufficient
basis for imputation of negligence, is a statement of the proposition
that every owner-passenger has a presumed right to control the driver
and therefore is chargeable with the contributory negligence of the
driver.
The earliest imputed negligence case cited in the Slutter opinion
is Vacek v. State ex rel. Rokos.55 In that case, the negligence of the
driver, a friend of the owner, was imputed to the owner-passenger who
was held liable for the death of another passenger. The Maryland Court
of Appeals, refusing to assign error to the lower court's denial of a
directed verdict for the defendant who had claimed joint enterprise,
affirmed, holding that "[E]ven if there was no other evidence in the
case than the defendant's on this point, . . . the ultimate power and
authority in the selection, control, and discharge""6 of the driver rested
in the defendant owner-passenger. The court seemed to be concerned
with the fact that the owner, on the trip to his shore house, had refused
the subsequent tortfeasor permission to drive and had in fact ejected
him from the driver's seat. On the return trip, the owner again was
faced with the question of whether the tortfeasor would be allowed to
drive, and this time he acquiesced. 7 Although the court recognized that
the power and duty to control the acts of the servant are essential to a
finding of respondeat superior, the court did not base its decision on a
presumed or theoretical right of control. Some of the court's language
concerns "right of control,"5 but the case is firmly founded upon the
doctrine of respondeat superior.5" Twelve years later, in Powers v.
State ex rel. Reynolds,"0 the negligence of the driver was imputed to
55. 155 Md. 400, 142 A. 491 (1928), discussed in 5 MD. L. Rzv. 104 (1940)(criticizing the creation of an agency relationship in the Vacek case).56. 155 Md. at 409, 142 A. at 494. The defendant contended that decedent was
engaged in a joint enterprise and therefore the driver was his servant also.
57. Id. at 406-07, 142 A. at 493. One of the main criticisms of this case is founded
upon the fact that the other passengers may have urged the owner to allow the
tortfeasor to drive. The court held: "In order to prevent recovery in this case, the
evidence must have shown at least that Rokos [deceased] had the right to participate,
with authority, in the selection, control and discharge of the driver." Id. at 409,
142 A. at 494.
58. The Vacek court cited Pease v. Gardner, 113 Me. 264, 93 A. 550 (1915), which
deals with the borrowed servant doctrine:
The test is whether in the particular service which he is engaged or requested
to perform he continues liable to the direction and control of his original master,
or becomes subject to that of the person to whom he is lent or hired or who
requests his services. It is not so much the actual exercise of control which is
regarded as the right to exercise control [emphasis added]. 155 Md. at 407, 142
A. at 493.
59. The Vacek court cited 39 C.J. 1269 (1925)
To constitute the relation of master and servant for the purpose of fixingliability on the former for acts of the latter under the doctrine of respondeat
superior, it is indispensable that the right to select is essential to the relation.
This right must be accompanied with the power and duty to control the alleged
servant while in his employ; ... [emphasis added]. 155 Md. at 408, 142 A. at 494,
and see note 28 supra.
60. 178 Md. 23, 11 A.2d 909 (1940), noted in 5 MD. L. Rv. 104 (1940).
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an owner-passenger who was intoxicated and asleep in the back seat.
Defendant owner-passenger first assigned error contending that the
lower court should have granted his motion for a directed verdict on the
ground that the driver was not operating the automobile on his
behalf."' The Maryland Court of Appeals, answering that the mere fact
that the owner asked someone else to drive does not mean he has
given up his right to control, stated:
The owner has the right and duty to prevent, if possible, the
driver from operating the machine in a reckless and dangerous
manner. If the car is negligently operated, it is presumed that the
owner consented to the negligence. Therefore, in the absence of
proof that he abandoned the right of control, he is liable for any
damage resulting from the negligence of the driver.6 2
The owner-passenger next contended that the deceased was engaged
in a joint enterprise. In answer to this proposition, the court cited
the "both-ways" rule of imputed contributory negligence: "In order
to impute the negligence of a driver of a motor vehicle to another occu-
pant, in an action brought against a third party alleged to have been
negligent, it must be shown that the relationship of the parties was
that of partners, or principal and agent, or master and servant." 3
The court seemed to ignore completely the rationale of the Vacek case,
since here in Powers, even though both cases imputed the negligence
of a driver to an owner-passenger, the court founded its decision upon
the "right to control" theory, i.e., the presumed right to control the
driver based solely on ownership, and completely overlooked the
respondeat superior language of Vacek. The Powers court did cite
Vacek, 4 but only as an example of a case holding that the parties
had not embarked upon a joint enterprise.
In Wallace v. Fowler,"5 the Maryland Court of Appeals was faced
with cross-suits. An owner-passenger was suing the occupants of
61. 178 Md. at 28, 11 A.2d at 911. The deceased was the date of the owner-
passenger. The driver was accompanied by his wife. All had been drinking but it was
evidently determined that the driver was the only one sober enough to drive. The
owner-passenger and decedent were in the back seat.
The dissent points out that the driver was the only one of the group deemed
by the others sober enough to drive. Id. at 34, 11 A.2d at 915.
62. Id. at 28, 11 A.2d at 911 (emphasis added). The cases cited by this court at
this point were generally concerned with the right to control test. Randolph v. Hunt,
41 Cal. App. 739, 183 P. 359 (1919) (negligence of employee imputed to owner-
passenger) ; Rodgers v. Saxton, 305 Pa. 479, 158 A. 166 (1931) (negligence of hus-
band not imputed to wife-owner-passenger since no showing of right to control).
63. 178 Md. at 29, 11 A.2d at 912, citing Potter v. Florida Motor Lines, Inc., 57
F.2d 313 (S.D. Fla. 1932). Vacek was not cited at this point. The Court later pointed
out that even if it were a joint enterprise, "[tlhe doctrine of imputed negligence is
inapplicable as between the parties." 178 Md. at 31, 11 A.2d at 912.
64. 178 Md. at 30, 11 A.2d at 912. In a strong dissent, Judge Offutt, with Chief
Judge Bond concurring, pointed out that the deceased also chose the driver in this case
and that she knew he had been drinking. Therefore it was reasoned that she was guilty
of contributory negligence and could not, herself, have recovered against the defendant,
had she lived. Id. at 33-37, 11 A.2d at 914-15.
Both this case and Vacek are criticized in a Note, Auto Owner's Liability
for Injury Caused by Guest Permitted to Drive, 5 MD. L. Rsv. 104 (1940).
65. 183 Md. 97, 36 A.2d 691 (1944).
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another car. The lower court found for the owner-passenger on the
ground that his female friend, who was driving at the time of the acci-
dent, was not negligent. On appeal, the case was reversed, the female
friend being found primarily negligent, and judgment awarded against
the owner-passenger and in favor of the occupants of the other car.
The court indicated it was applying the rule of imputed negligence,
but did not cite cases or authorities.8"
The Maryland court was first faced with an imputed contributory
negligence case in Merritt v. Darden,7 where the contributory negli-
gence of the driver, a child of the owner-passenger, was imputed to the
owner-passenger-parent s to bar recovery from the negligent driver
of the other car. The trial court had instructed the jury that the con-
tributory negligence of the driver did not bar recovery by the owner-
passenger-parent and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the owner.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed without a new trial. Again
ignoring the respondeat superior rationale of Vacek, the court based
its holding on the doctrine of "right to control." The court cited
Powers for the proposition that there is a presumption that an owner
is in control of an automobile while riding in it as a passenger and
is therefore liable for the negligence of the operator ;89 Wallace for the
proposition that the negligence of the operator is generally imputed to
an owner who is also a passenger ;70 Vacek for the statement that
"[I]t is not so much the actual exercise of control which is regarded,
as the right to exercise such control ;-171 and Gray v. Citizens Casualty
Co.,72 a Fourth Circuit case, in which Judge Sobeloff interpreted the
Powers case as standing for the proposition that in Maryland it is
not respondeat superior, but the "right to control" theory which under-
lies the imputation of negligence to the owner-passenger.7 3 The citation
from Vacek is completely misleading as to the holding of that case.
The quotation was lifted from the introductory background exploration
of the law of imputed negligence and had particular reference to the
borrowed servant doctrine.7 4  Although the Merritt court referred
without comment to the "both-ways" test of the Restatement,75 it made
no mention of respondeat superior. It can be argued that the court's
reference to the Restatement and other authorities" concerning the
doctrine of imputed negligence, and its complete reliance upon the "right
66. "[T]o the facts in evidence here, we can reach no other conclusion than that
the primary negligence in this case was that of Mrs. Elswick, [the driver] which is
imputed to Fowler, [the owner-passenger] and that there is no legally sufficient
evidence that Wallace [driver-owner of other car] was negligent at all." Id. at
104, 36 A.2d at 694.
67. 227 Md. 589, 176 A.2d 205 (1962).
68. See note 53 supra; Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 1191 (1966).
69. 227 Md. at 596, 176 A.2d at 209.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 596-97, 176 A.2d at 209; see note 59 supra and accompanying text.
72. 286 F.2d 625 (4th Cir. 1960).
73. "However, an agency relationship is not necessary to be shown, for the failure
of the owner, who is present, to exercise his presumed control makes him liable."
Id. at 627.
74. Discussed at note 58 supra and accompanying text.
75. RzSTATEMENT or ToRTs § 485 (1934).
76. Id., i.e., the both-ways rule of the doctrine of imputed contributory negligence;
W. PROSseR, TORTS § 54 (2d ed. 1955).
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to control" theory for imputing such negligence, indicate that the terms
doctrine of imputed negligence and right to control were synonymous in
the minds of the court in this case.
If, arguendo, this synonymy can be used to explain the language
of the Maryland Court of Appeals in the most recent case of Slutter v.
Homer 7 it more clearly shows the court's dissatisfaction with the
doctrine of imputed negligence, and, at the same time, explains the con-
fusing language of the case. The Slutter court first considered the
Merritt decision. Noting that the facts of the two cases were very
similar, the court pointed out that there were "two distinguishable
legal theories ' 78 which have been invoked "even by the same court, to
bar recovery by the owner-occupant-parent. 1'  The court cited Merritt
as an example, stating that one theory is "the negligence of the opera-
tor of the car is generally imputed to the owner-passenger."8 " The court
continued:
However, in Vacek v. State, Use of Rokos relied upon in Merritt,
the issue was regarded primarily as one of whether the doctrine
of respondeat superior was applicable. In Vacek, the enterprise in
which the car was driven was a trip made by friends, with the
owner of the car a passenger, and, while some of the Court's
language is that of imputation of negligence rather than that of
agency, the controlling issue in the opinion is whether the relation
of master and servant existed."' [Citation omitted]
This was the first time in thirty-eight years that Vacek had been cited
for the proposition for which it clearly stands, i.e. - imputed negli-
gence rests upon the doctrine of respondeat superior. In describing
Vacek, the Slutter court used the terms "imputation of negligence" and
"agency." It is suggested that, by the former, the court meant "right to
control" based solely on ownership of the automobile as a basis for
imputing negligence, while by the latter the court meant the doctrine
of respondeat superior as a basis for imputing negligence. The court
continued, pointing out that the doctrine of imputed negligence "rests
on the presumption that the non-driving owner had the right to control
the vehicle,"8 2 while the agency doctrine (i.e., respondeat superior)
rests on the relationship of the parties, in short, "is predicated on a
status rather than on inference of fact."183 The court next noted Judge
Sobeloff's interpretation of the Maryland law as expressed in Gray v.
Citizens Casualty Co. 4 (interpreting Powers as "right to control"),
but the Powers case itself was not mentioned in the opinion.
77. 244 Md. 131, 223 A.2d 141 (1966), discussed in note 52 supra and accom-
panying text.
78. 244 Md. at 138, 223 A.2d at 144.
79. Id.
80. Id. This proposition is to be found in the previous discussion of Merritt, which
cited Powers and Wallace to support the right to control theory.
81. 244 Md. at 138-39, 223 A.2d at 144 (emphasis supplied).
82. Id. at 139, 223 A.2d at 145.
83. Id.
84. 286 F.2d 625 (4th Cir. 1960) ; see note 67 supra and accompanying text.
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In conclusion, the Slutter court noted the fact that the doctrine
of imputed contributory negligence has been criticized as a fiction;"5
that the doctrine has been rejected by the Restatement, 6 but that
§ 485 of the Restatement is still subject to "the accepted and realistic
statements as to the agency situation set forth in §§ 486 and 491, ' 87
and therefore retains the rule where a master-servant relationship is
involved. The court then accepted the "common purpose doctrine" of§ 491, comment (j),"s as a basis for finding the Restatement of Agency
applicable to explain § 485 of the Restatement of Torts. Comment (c)
to § 238 of the Restatement of Agency states:
A child, however, may be the servant of his parent in driving
an automobile in pursuance of his parent's orders or on his parent's
business. If, for instance, a minor son is driving the family auto-
mobile with his father in the back seat, it is inferred that because
of the ownership and the parental relation the parent has such
control as causes him to be master for this purpose.8 9
The court therefore held that the daughter "was the agent of her mother,
not on the basis of the rejected family car doctrine, (citations omitted),
but because, on the facts, respondeat superior applie[d]," and there-
fore the holding of the trial court, that the owner-passenger-parent was
barred from recovery, was correct whether based on "the law of agency
[respondeat superior] or on the controversial doctrine of imputed neg-
ligence [right to control]."9'
Although contributory negligence will continue to be imputed in
Maryland where a master-servant relationship exists, there is a strong
basis for arguing that Maryland has now rejected the theory that con-
tributory negligence may be imputed on the basis of the right to control
which is presumed to accompany ownership of the vehicle. Substantia-
tion is to be found in the following: (a) the general language of
Slutter; (b) Slutter did not cite Powers; (c) Vacek was finally given
due consideration; (d) Merritt, a "presumed right to control" case,
was cited as relying on Vacek when, in actuality, Merritt's only ref-
erence to Vacek was for the very proposition which the Slutter court
said had been misunderstood, i.e., presumed right to control ;91 (e) later
cases seem to indicate an agency relationship may now be required in
Maryland.92 Evidence of agency beyond ownership of the vehicle would
now seem to be required for contributory negligence to be imputed.
85. 244 Md. at 139, 223 A.2d at 145, stating: "The criticism rests on the practical
consideration that, while back-seat driving is generally an annoyance, and simetimes
a danger, it is almost never a physical fact." This is another confirmation that in
the minds of the Maryland court, imputed contributory negligence and the right to
control theory are one and the same.
86. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
87. 244 Md. at 139, 223 A.2d at 145.
88. "[flf the purpose of the journey is for the benefit of the owner, even thoughit is also for the benefit of him who is permitted to drive, the owner may under theprinciples of the law of Agency be regarded as the master of the driver even though
no wages or reward other than the participation in the drive is paid to him."
89. RESTAUMt5NT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 238, comment c (1958).
90. 244 Md. at 140, 223 A.2d at 145.
91. See note 73 supra and accompanying text.
92. Two recent non-owner-passenger cases have indicated that it must be shown
that the driver of the vehicle was the agent or servant of the owner in order to bar
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In one way, the Minnesota court in Weber was faced with an
easier question than that presented to the Maryland court. In Minnesota,
the owner of an automobile is liable by statute to persons injured by
the negligence of one driving the automobile with permission. Thus
the Minnesota court could abrogate the rule of imputed contributory
negligence in automobile cases without affecting the liability of a de-
fendant owner. Since part of the discussion of the Maryland court in
Slutter is directed to imputed negligence generally and part to the
Restatement's rejection of imputed contributory negligence, it is not
certain whether the seeming disapproval of the doctrine of imputed
negligence should be read as limited to the contributory negligence
issue before it or as comprehending primary negligence as well. As
the Minnesota court and others have pointed out, there are valid policy
reasons for distinguishing the two situations. However, the realities
of a passenger trying to control a driver would seem to dictate restric-
tion of liability for primary negligence as well as narrowing the situa-
tions in which contributory negligence will be imputed.
CONCLUSION
The Maryland Court of Appeals has apparently rejected any impu-
tation of negligence to an owner of an automobile merely because he is
the owner and a passenger. Probably it will require a showing of a
master-servant relationship, that is, of a conventional respondeat su-
perior situation, by other evidence, before it will impute either direct
or contributory negligence to the owner. On the other hand, it must
be admitted that this apparent disapproval of the earlier cases is as
yet only dicta; therefore, until the court is presented a case in which
it can clarify its position, the presumed "right to control" test of
Powers may be difficult to overcome in the lower courts with regard
to the imputation of primary negligence. The prior case on contribu-
tory negligence, Merritt, however, involved a parent-child relationship
and some family business, as did Slutter, and can now properly be
reinterpreted as an "agency" case in light of the Slutter opinion.
The Minnesota court has taken a highly desirable step in com-
pletely eliminating the doctrine of imputed contributory negligence.
the owner's cause of action for damages to his automobile due to the possible con-
tributory negligence of the driver. Clark v. Junkins, 245 Md. 104, 107, 225 A.2d 275,
277 (1967); Talbott v. Gegenheimer, 245 Md. 186, 189, 225 A.2d 462, 464 (1967).
Although Gellerson v. Raisens, Daily Record, Nov. 27, 1967 at 5, may appear at first
blush to negate the argument that Maryland has rejected presumed right to control
based on ownership by saying, "It is clear that negligent conduct by the operator of
a vehicle is not imputable to a passenger in the absence of an agency relationship or
actual or presumed control by the passenger," it is apparent from the context of the
appeal that the court's objective was much less profound. In this suit by a non-owner-
passenger riding on the handlebars of a bicycle, against the driver of an automobile,
the lower court erroneously refused to instruct the jury that the negligence, if any,
of the operator of the bicycle should not be imputed to the passenger. While ostensibly
reversing on this ground, the court's actual motivation appears to be a desire for
further exploration of the question of plaintiff's own contributory negligence. In any
case, the statement about presumed right to control is merely a dictum, since this was
not an owner-passenger case.
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"If negligence is based on fault, it is difficult to rationalize imputed neg-
ligence where the party seeking recovery is without fault.' 93 It is time
to recognize boldly that respondeat superior or imputed negligence is
designed to serve the policy of finding a financially responsible de-
fendant. Lacking any more rational plan of automobile accident com-
pensation,94 the law may justly make the owner-passenger liable for
the negligence of the driver, even though no real fault of the owner is
found. However, the social policy which may justify such imputation
of primary negligence does not justify the doctrine of imputed con-
tributory negligence in such a situation.
93. 144 N.W.2d at 542. "Precedents drawn from the days of travel by stagecoachdo not fit the conditions of travel today." MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y.
382, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916) (from the majority opinion of Judge Cardozo). TheMinnesota court in Weber stated: "We are convinced the time has come to discard
this rule which is defensible only on the grounds of its antiquity. In doing so we
realize we may stand alone, but a doctrine so untenable should not be followed so
as to bar recovery of one entitled to damages." 144 N.W.2d at 545.
"The rule to be desired is that each person be held responsible for his own
negligence; and such personal negligence alone should determine whether the injured
person is entitled to recover damages. . . .No negligence of a driver should beimputed to a passenger in an action by the latter against a third party solely because
of the status or relationship between the two." Lessler, supra note 10, at 175.
94. Some authorities feel that automobile compensation plans should replace tortlaw in the future. This would allow for less litigation, more protection, and faster
recovery for the injured. See generally W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, PUBLIC LAW PER-
SPECTIVES ON A PRIVATE LAW PROBLEM; AUTO COMPENSATION PLANS (1965); R.
KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM (1965); WallStreet Journal, Sept. 11, 1967, at 6, col. 1 (proposing workmen's compensation type
scheme in New York, not dependent on negligence of either party).
1967]
